Storm warning: mitigating the impact of space weather on critical infrastructure

Introduction

The Hazards Forum event, Storm warning: mitigating the impact of space weather on critical infrastructure, chaired by Megan Pearce from the Natural Hazards Interest Group and Marc McBride from the Emerging and Future Technology Interest Group, focused on the growing importance of space weather and its potential impacts on modern critical infrastructure, a timely discussion given the ongoing peak in solar activity. The primary objective was to foster a deeper understanding of space weather phenomena, assess their current and future implications for essential services, and deliberate on effective resilience strategies to mitigate potential disruptions. Participants included experts from meteorology, energy, aviation, and research institutions, reflecting the multidisciplinary nature of the challenge.

We welcomed four speakers: 

• Simon Machin – Space Weather Programme Manager, UK Met Office: Space weather – Advances of UK monitoring and prediction capabilities
• Ravindra Desai – Assistant Professor in Space Weather, University of Warwick’s Centre for Fusion, Space and Astrophysics: Understanding Space Weather: From fundamental physics to societal impact
• Matthew Allcock – Space Weather Consultant: How to keep UK critical national infrastructure operating during severe space weather and
• Kevin Pepper – Principal Nuclear Safety Inspector, Office for Nuclear Regulation: Why do nuclear facilities care about space weather; and how do they manage it?

Modelling and forecasting challenges

The Met Office’s Space Weather Operations Centre and the SWIMMR programme (£20 million of funding, including development of six new operational models) were presented as key monitoring and prediction efforts. The GORGON model (Imperial College) for forecasting Geomagnetic Induced Current (GIC) in power and rail networks was also discussed. Concerns included understanding electronic upsets in aircraft and ensuring effective user utilisation of model data. The Gannon storm (May last year, G5 rated) demonstrated disruptions to aircraft and ground electronics, necessitating flight path adjustments. Risks to satellites from increasing orbital congestion were highlighted. The need for real-time forecasting models for extreme events (like the March 1991 and May 2024 events) to enhance satellite safety was emphasized. Historical data from the British Geological Survey (back to 1847) and digitised logbooks (1741-1747) were reviewed, but large error bars in extreme event predictions due to limited data remain a challenge. Coronal mass ejections offer only about 20 minutes warning.

Building critical infrastructure resilience

A 2013 assessment by the Royal Academy of Engineering considered the impact of space weather on a range of technologies. A recent UK SWIMMR project report, based on discussions with 110 organizations, highlighted current resilience status. Nuclear operators (e.g., EDF Energy) use extreme value analysis for space weather hazards, acknowledging that perfect resilience is unattainable. The satellite industry’s radiation testing was cited as good practice of achieving resilience by design. Prioritising vulnerabilities and National Grid’s identification of transformer/substation vulnerabilities were discussed. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provides space weather advisories to aviation, emphasizing contingency procedures.

GIC and nuclear facility resilience

Concerns have been raised in a recent NEA report that GIC risks to nuclear power plants (NPPs) might not be adequately considered. Only Canada, Sweden, and the UK – all at high geographic latitudes – are currently considering space weather in NPP design and operation. There are limited reported GIC event impacts (minor, no significant 2024 event) at NPPs. Blocking neutral currents at one site might transfer problems elsewhere. The NEA recommends that NPP operators review plant safety cases for GIC risks, and member states are encouraged to improve GIC understanding and monitoring. Further work is needed on design basis events and equipment resilience. The debate on active vs. passive duplicate systems for resilience arose. Geographic latitude might be less significant for GIC than electrical line connectivity and geology. Lightly loaded transformers show more GIC tolerance. A lack of measured GIC data complicates the analysis. Current transformer-level monitoring is insufficient for accurate forecasting.

Mitigation and future work

Industries lack mature approaches for infrequent hazards, such as extreme space weather. There’s a concern about plant operators disconnecting assets due to poor information, risking cascading blackouts. Historical data on solar energetic particles goes back to the 1700s, but extrapolating for rare events is challenging. Concerns about varying resilience of equipment at nuclear sites and other critical infrastructure were raised. Older pneumatic systems were noted as more reliable than some modern, single-point vulnerable systems. Concerns about third-party risk assessments overlooking vulnerabilities in modern technologies were discussed. Space weather has minimal impact on terrestrial weather, while more data is needed to validate NPP hazard prediction models.

The discussions highlighted several areas for further work to improve resilience strategies:

• Develop next-generation models for electronic upsets and flight routing advice.
• Improve models for individual transformer risk assessment across the UK power network.
• Develop real-time simulations and models for extreme space weather events to enhance satellite safety.
• Conduct more missions to gather data for space weather forecasting models.
• Implement a resilience framework: map risk pathways, characterize hazards, plan for resilience by design and operations.
• Design infrastructure with passive resilience, including shielding and redundancy.
• Engage organisations in exercises and simulations to improve space weather resilience.
• Encourage infrastructure operators to improve GIC analysis, including monitoring transformer currents and harmonic distortion.
• Task infrastructure operators with reviewing plant safety cases for GIC risks, aligning regulators’ expectations.
• Conduct further work on design basis events and equipment/facility resilience.
• Improve understanding of magnetic fields associated with coronal mass ejections for better forecasting.
• Build mitigation strategies based on risk tolerance and operational responses to forecasts/warnings.
• Explore the connection between natural hazards and emerging technologies for system resilience.

 Conclusion

This Hazards Forum event underscored the critical and evolving challenge of space weather to modern critical infrastructure. While progress in monitoring and understanding of space weather phenomena is evident, significant work remains. Discussions highlighted vulnerabilities in communication, aviation, and GIC’s complex interplay with infrastructure such as nuclear facilities. The emphasis on improved forecasting, proactive resilience planning, and collaborative data gathering outlines a clear path forward. The diverse next steps reflect a collective commitment to bolstering defences against space weather, ensuring the robustness of essential services in the face of future solar activity.